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NOTES AND COMMENTS
This is the attitude taken by the New Jersey court in the principal
case. It is submitted that this should be the attitude taken by any
court in reviewing the subject.
To11MAs L. NoRuis, JR.
Torts--Lookout-Duty to Maintain at Green Light
In the recent case of Currin v. Williams,1 plaintiff entered the inter-
section with a green light in his favor but without maintaining a lookout
for traffic approaching on the intersecting street. Defendant entered the
intersection from plaintiff's left while the traffic control signal facing
him was red. Though not conclusive, there was some evidence to sup-
port a conclusion that had plaintiff looked he would have been put on
notice that defendant was not going to stop. Held: Plaintiff's failure to
look to the right and the left when he entered the intersection on the
green light was not contributory negligence as a matter of law, but the
issue of contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury.
Since, in accidents of this nature, failure to maintain a lookout is
invariably alleged, it is essential that attorneys know (1) what is meant
by lookout,2 (2) what constitutes the motorist's duty to maintain a
lookout, and (3) what effect automatic traffic signals have upon that
duty.
In its inception, lookout was probably a nautical term designating
that member of a ship's crew charged with the duty of keeping watch
for danger.8 Stated quite simply, the duty of a motorist to maintain a
lookout is analogous to the duty of that crew member; the motorist
must keep watch for possible danger. 4 Quite naturally, one indispen-
162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953). There the court says: "Ordinarily, when a court decides
to modify or abandon a court made rule of long standing, it starts out by saying
that 'the reason for the rule no longer exists.' In this case it is correct to say
that the 'reason' originally given for the rule of immunity never did exist." Id.
at 167, 260 P.2d at 768.
1248 N.C. 32, 102 S.E.2d 455 (1958).
' One of a number of descriptive words usually accompanies the word lookout.
See, e.g., Wright v. Ponitz, 44 Cal. App. 2d 215, 112 P.2d 25 (1941) (ordinary
careful lookout) ; Wilder v. Cadle, 227 Ky. 486, 13 S.W.2d 497 (1929) (reasonable
lookout) ; Broussard v. Hotard, 4 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 1941) (sharp lookout) ;
Wright v. Pegram, 244 N.C. 45, 92 S.E.2d 416 (1956) (proper lookout) ; Murray v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 218 N.C. 392, 11 S.E.2d 326 (1940) (reasonably careful
lookout).
'See Devore v. Schaffer, 245 Iowa 1017, 65 N.W.2d 553 (1954).
'There are four classes of hazards which the motorist must guard against:(1) defects or hazards of the road surface, (2) objects or persons standing or
moving in the path of the approaching vehicle, (3) . objects or hazards which,
without negligence, may enter or attempt to enter the path of the vehicle prior to,
or at the time of, its passage, (4) objects or persons which negligently enter or
attempt to enter the path of the vehicle prior to, or at the time of, its
passage. Barrett, Mechanics of Control and Lookout in Automobile Law, 14
TuL L. Rtv. 493, 507 (1940).
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sable element in the maintenance of a lookout is the use of the eyes. To
fulfill his obligation, the motorist must not limit the observation to his
immediate front ;5 he must look to the sides-right and left-and to
the rear as well.6 Of course, the courts will take cognizance of the fact
that he cannot simultaneously look in four different directions. 7  In
many situations common sense will dictate in which direction a driver
should look first;8 however, there is no mathematical formula for de-
termining when the obligation is fulfilled, 9 because looking is only a part
of the duty. Not only must the driver look, but the purpose of looking
must be accomplished;1O and if there is evidence that he did not see
what he ought to have seen, it is considered as evidence of failure to
maintain a lookout." Thus, stated broadly and generally, it appears
that the duty to maintain a lookout requires that the driver have an
awareness of those things surrounding him which are visible and which
might have the effect of impeding the safe progress of his motor vehicle.
A question frequently raised is whether the same lookout is re-
quired in the face of an automatic traffic signal showing green as is
required absent the automatic traffic signal. To arrive at a sensible
answer to the question, it is necessary to know that automatic traffic
signals are placed at intersections to render crossings less dangerous
and to facilitate the flow of traffic.12  Since traffic lawfully in the
intersection when the light changes must be allowed to clear the inter-
5 Mumford v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1957); Ehrhard v.
Ruan Transp. Corp., 245 Iowa 193, 61 N.W.2d 696 (1953) ; Brooks v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 91 So. 2d 403 (La. App. 1956) ; Evett v. Corbin, 305 S.W.2d
469 (Mo. 1957).
' Scott v. Marshall, 90 Ohio App. 347, 105 N.E.2d 281 (1951). See Kosbar v.
Johnson, 185 Pa. Super. 510, 138 A.2d 872 (1958), where it was stated that one
is not required to stop at every tree and clump of shrubs and look behind the
leaves to see if an automobile lurks in ambush. Naturally the degree of care re-
quired in making observations to the rear is not as great as the degree of care
required in making observations to the front. Dreher v. Divine, 192 N.C. 325, 135
S.E. 29 (1926).
"Gross v. Smith, 388 Pa. 92, 130 A.2d 90 (1957); Koehler v. Schwartz, 382
Pa. 352, 115 A.2d 155 (1955).
a For example, when a motorist is approaching an intersection, he should first
look to his left, because he first enters the lane in which traffic on his left is
moving. Grande v. Wooleyhan Transp. Co., 353 Pa. 535, 46 A:2d 241 (1946);
Dandridge v. Exhibitors Serv. Co., 167 Pa. Super. 143, 74 A.2d 670 (1950).
Bosell v. Rannestad, 226 Minn. 413, 33 N.W.2d 40 (1948). See also Davidson
v. Vast, 233 Iowa 534, 10 N.W.2d 12 (1943) ; Morrisette v. A. G. Boone Co., 235
N.C. 162, 69 S.E.2d 239 (1952) ; Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P.2d 350 (1940).
" Donnelly v. Goforth, 284 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. 1955) ; Taylor v. Brake, 245 N.C.
553, 96 S.E.2d 686 (1957). See also Peckham v. Knofla, 130 Conn. 646, 36 A.2d
740 (1944) ; Blakeman v. Lofland, 173 Kan. 725, 252 P.2d 852 (1953) ; Marshburn
v. Patterson, 241 N.C. 441, 85 S.E.2d 683 (1955) ; Shew v. Bailey, 37 Tenn. App.
40, 260 S.W.2d 362 (1951) ; Perry v. Thompson, 196 Va. 817, 86 S.E.2d 35 (1955).
" To look and fail to see what could have been seen by keeping a proper lookout
is as negligent as not to have looked at all. Goodhue v. Ballard, 122 Conn. 542, 191
Atl. 101 (1937) ; Mitchell v. Terrell, 55 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 1951) ; Donnelly v.
Goforth, supra note 10; Nehi Bottling Co. v. Lambert, 196 Va. 949, 86 S.E.2d 156
(1955).12 Gross v. Smith, 388 Pa. 92, 130 A.2d 90 (1957).
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section before the motorist having the favorable signal proceeds,13 the go
signal does not literally mean that the motorist can go under any and all
circumstances. 1 4 The signals are designed to prevent accidents and not
to excuse them ;15 therefore, it would be absurd to assume that a green
light gives the driver the privilege to wilfully or recklessly run down
people or automobiles with impunity. Reasonable care must be exercised
for the safety of others. 16 In approaching a blind unguarded intersection,
a motorist, in the exercise of reasonable care, must slow down to a
"snail's pace" and maneuver his automobile into a position where he can
look to the right and left along the intersecting street and determine that
the crossing can be made safely. 17 Is the same thing required when an
automatic traffic signal is placed at the intersection?
Answering the question in the affirmative, a minority has held that
the duty of a motorist to exercise care at an intersection is not relaxed
by reason of the presence of a green traffic signal.' 8 For purposes of
simplicity, the holding of these courts will be referred to as Rule 1.
On the other hand, a definite majority has answered the question in the
negative, holding that a green traffic light lessens the degree of care
required.'9 The holding of the latter courts will be referred to as
Rule 2. In view of the fact that a motorist is not required to anticipate
" Freeman v. Churchill, 30 Cal. 2d 453, 183 P.2d 4 (1947) ; fDavis v. Dondanville,
107 Ind. App. 665, 26 N.E.2d 568 (1940); Styskal v. Brickey, 158 Neb. 208, 62
N.W.2d 854 (1954); Indianapolis & Southeastern Trailways, Inc. v. Cincinnati
Street Ry., 166 Ohio St. 310, 142 N.E.2d 515 (1957); Lanegan v. Crauford, 49
Wash. 2d 562, 304 P.2d 953 (1956).
"4 Scully v. Railway Express Agency, 137 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Pa. 1956);
Roland v. Murray, 239 S.W.2d 967 (Ky. 1951) ; Valench v. Belle Isle Cab Co.,
196 Md. 118, 75 A.2d 97 (1950) ; Witt v. Peterson, 310 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. 1958) ;
Fuss v. Williamson, 160 Neb. 141, 69 N.W.2d 539 (1955) ; Jordan v. Kennedy, 180
Pa. Super. 593, 119 A.2d 679 (1956) ; Arney v. Bogstad, 199 Va. 460, 100 S.E.2d749 (1957).
Adkins v. Smith, 98 S.E.2d 712 (W.Va. 1957).,
Cases cited note 14 mupra.
'7 See Green v. Higbee, 176 Kan. 596, 272 P.2d 1084 (1954) ; Reaney v. Mabry,
97 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 1957) ; MacDonald v. Skornia, 322 Mich. 370, 34 N.W.2d
4 (1948) ; Papkin v. Helfand & Katz, 346 Pa. 485, 31 A.2d 112 (1943) ; Bailey v.
Zwirowski, 268 Wis. 208, 67 N.W.2d 262 (1954). See also Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d
1202 (1958).
"s Spence v. Waters, 39 Del. (9 W.W. Harr.) 582, 4 A.2d 142 (Super. Ct.
1938) ; Grimes v. Yellow Cab Co., 344 Pa. 298, 25 A.2d 294 (1942) ; Byrne v. 0. G.
Schultz, Inc., 306 Pa. 427, 160 Atl.. 125 (1932) ; Vol Cannon v. Philadelphia Transp,
Go., 148 Pa. Super. 330, 25 A.2d 584 (1942). "He must be vigilant, must exercise
a high degree of care.... This duty has not been relaxed by the introduction of
traffic officers and signals .... He is still bound to the same degree of care as
before the introduction of these modern aids to travel." Byrne v. 0. G. Schultz,
Inc., supra at 433, 160 Atl. at 127. (Emphasis added) It may be arguable that
the court intended to require due care, but the language used certainly indicates
that more than due care was required.
7 9 Taylor v. Sims, 72 Cal. App. 2d 60, 164 P.2d 17 (1945); Sullivan v. Locke,
73 So. 2d 616 (La. App. 1954) ; Buehler v. Beadia, 343 Mich. 692, 73 N.W.2d 304(1955) ; Hyder v. Asheville Storage Battery Co., 242 N.C. 553, 89 S.E.2d 124(1955) ; Jordan v. Kennedy, 180 Pa. Super, 593, 119 A.2d 679 (1956) ; Wilson v.
Koch, 241 Wis. 594, 6 N.W.2d 659 (1942).
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negligence on the part of others, 20 Rule 2 seems eminently more sensible.
Take, for example, the case of a motorist approaching an intersection
which is surrounded by buildings that obstruct his view to the left and
to the right. If this motorist has a green light when he approaches the
intersection, what must he do? Not even Rule 1 would require him to
stop his automobile, get out and peer around the obstruction to see if
motorists approaching on the intersecting street are going to stop in
obedience to the red traffic signal. But it seems that Rule 1 would re-
quire him to bring his vehicle virtually to a halt, inch forward into the
intersection, and determine that vehicles approaching from his left and
right are going to stop. Having made that determination, he could then
proceed. Under Rule 2, the motorist having the green light could
proceed uninterruptedly into the intersection and make his observation
to the left and right while in progress.
Consider a second example. Six streets converge at one point.
Each street carries six lanes of traffic. A reasonable and prudent
motorist has a green light in his favor as he approaches that maze.
What must he do? Must he stop in order that he may survey what
is occurring in the other lanes of traffic? Allowing the motorist the bene-
fit of Rule 2 enables him to continue his forward progress in reliance
upon the favorable signal. Of course, as previously stated, he may not
arbitrarily exercise his right.21 He must still exercise a degree of care
commensurate with the danger which continues to exist.22 Even so, he
is merrily on his way while the motorist operating under Rule 1 is still
sitting at the intersection in a state of bewilderment.
Considering that traffic lights have two purposes, it seems that Rule 1
should be discarded. While it may have the effect of rendering crossings
less dangerous, 2 it does not facilitate the flow of traffic. Having de-
termined that the autorratic traffic signal is green, the motorist must
take the same precautions he would have to take at an unguarded blind
intersection; therefore, under Rule 1, the green light is nothing more
" Messier v. Zanglis, 144 Conn. 449, 133 A.2d 619 (1957) ; Smith v. Sizemore,
300 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1957) ; Coyle v. Stopak, 165 Neb. 594, 86 N.W.2d 758 (1957) ;
Morgan v. Saunders, 236 N.C. 162, 72 S.E.2d 411 (1952); Henke v. Peyerl, 89
N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1958).
"1 Cases cited note 14 supra.
22 Cappo v. Baker, 91 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 1957) ; Sullivan v. Locke, 73 So. 2d
616 (La. App. 1954); Stephens v. Koprowski, 295 Mich. 213, 294 N.W. 158(1940) ; Witt v. Peterson, 310 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. 1958) ; Rynar v. Lincoln Transit
Co., 129 N.J.L. 525, 30 A.2d 406 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943) ; Dembicer v. Pawtucket
Cabinet & Builders Finish Co., 58 R.I. 451, 193 Atl. 622 (1937). See also Nelson
v. Ziegler, 89 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1956); Politte v. Miller, 301 S.W.2d 839 (Mo.
App. 1957) ; Groome v. Davis, 215 N.C. 510, 2 SE.2d 771 (1939) ; Reid v. Abbiati,
113 Vt. 233, 32 A.2d 133 (1943).
3 But see Perpetua v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 380 Pa. 561, 565, 112 A.2d
337, 339 (1955) (dissenting opinion), where it was said: "A hesitating, demurring
and irresolute driver is by no means the safest of drivers. Vacillation can cause as
much chaos as impetuosity."
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than an additional factor to be noted. On the other hand, Rule 2, which
allows the motorist to proceed uninterruptedly into the intersection and
make his observation while in progress, operates effectively as to both
purposes. Crossings are rendered less dangerous and the flow of
traffic is facilitated.
WILLIAm H. HOLDFORD
Workmen's Compensation-Analysis of "Jurisdictional Fact"
Review by Superior Courts
The North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act empowers the
Industrial Commission to make findings of fact which are binding on the
parties and on courts on appeal. Appeals from rulings of the Com-
mission may be taken only "for errors of law, under the same terms and
conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil actions."1
Cases in North Carolina reveal two lines of authority concerning
the extent to which findings by the Industrial Commission may be re-
viewed on appeal to the superior court. One group2 of cases shows
literal adherence to the language of the act in holding that the courts
may review only questions of law. The other group3 departs from the
literal language of the act and asserts that the superior court judge may
not only review questions of law, but that he may also make his own
findings of "jurisdictional fact"4 upon motion of the appellant.
I N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (1958) provides that the award of the Commission
"shall be conclusive and binding as'to all questions of fact; but either party to the
dispute may... appeal from the decision of said Commission to the superior court
... for errors of law, under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals in
ordinary civil actions... ." (Emphasis added.)2 Hawes v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 243 N.C. 62, 89 S.E.2d 739
(1955); Thomason v. Red Bird Cab Co., 235 N.C. 602, 70 S.E.2d 706 (1952);
Smith v. Southern Waste Paper Co., 226 N.C. 47, 36 S.E.2d 730 (1946) ; Hayes v.
Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 29 S.E.2d 137 (1944) ; Bivens v. Teer, 220 N.C. 135,
16 S.E.2d 659 (1941); Beach v. McLean, 219 N.C. 521, 14 S.E.2d 515 (1941);
Birchfield v. Department of Conservation and Development, 204 N.C. 217, 167 S.E.
855 (1933).
Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 92 S.E.2d 673 (1956) ; Aylor v.
Barnes, 242 N.C. 223, 87 S.E.2d 269 (1955); Francis v. Carolina Wood Turning
Co., 204 N.C. 701, 169 S.E. 654 (1933) ; Aycock v. Cooper, 202 N.C. 500, 505, 163
S.E. 569, 571 (1932) (dictum).
'"[I]n every proceeding of a judicial nature, there are one or more facts which
are strictly jurisdictional, the existence of which is necessary to the validity of the
proceedings, and without which the act of the court is a mere nullity .... " Nobel v.
Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 173 (1893).
Professor Larson has said that practically every fact decided in compensation
cases has some bearing on the tribunal's jurisdiction and that reduced to the absurd,
the rule could be used to render the tribunal powerless to decide any question with
finality. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 80.41 (1952).
The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, has termed only three issues
questions of "jurisdictional fact": (1). Was the injured worker an employee?
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2) (1958); Francis v. Carolina: Wood Turning Co.,
stepra note 3; (2) Does the defendant regularly work five or more employees?
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(b) (1958); Aycock v. Cooper, supra note 3; (3) If
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